::::: : the wood : davidrobins.net

My name is David Robins: Christian, lead developer (resume), writer, photographer, runner, libertarian (voluntaryist), and student.

This is also my son David Geoffrey Robins' site.

The basis and extent of private property

Political, Law, Economics ·Monday May 23, 2011 @ 00:26 EDT (link)

As promised from the entry on Taxtion = robbery, a discussion on the nature of private property.

From Locke we get the idea of homesteading: mixing labor with property (real and otherwise). From him and others such as Rothbard, Nozick, and Rand (and many more, surely; those are just some luminaries that came to mind)—voluntary trade. Gifts are a subset of voluntary trade: a person elects to give someone something in return for nothing at all; this includes inheritance. These are the only legitimate ways in which property may change owners. Theft, robbery (which, as we saw, includes that robbery the state labls "taxation"), extortion, involuntary trade—all of these are illegitimate ways for property to change hands, and do not change ownership. If A steals from B and then B recaptures his possession, A is all the time the owner and the transfer back is not theft.

What counts as homesteading? If the state vanished overnight, could I fence the present Gila National Forest and claim it as my own? Of course, I couldn't use it all myself, but once I owned it, I could borrow against it to hire people to cut trees, or lease it out, right? Of course, that's a bit of a chicken-and-egg issue; something seems not right: I didn't have the means to harvest the Gila forest before I claimed it, and now I'm using my claim to profit from my claim. So one can reasonably request that homesteading requires pre-existing abilities; but then an existing logging company owner (or just a wealthy person) can claim a lot more forest than a regular individual. How, then, to prevent present moneyed interests from creating a new state?

If everyone was starting off from a state of nature, the question wouldn't arise because one would expect there to be enough property for everyone, or every family, to be able to have enough land to farm and to be able to homestead a share of the continental land mass. Later trade or some people's specialization might change the balance of ownership, but there would initially be little contention. Still: if two people want the same piece of land, how is it arranged? The normal market mechanism is price, but to whom is the price paid? Would one person pay the other to forgo their claim?

A digression into the new laws—even anarchy has laws, you may be surprised to find out; read Rothbard for some groundwork if you're missing it—on property may be in order. Private arbitration will tend toward majority opinion (because those that don't have no customers and no revenue); so to a point we are still hostage to a majority, albeit hopefully one that adheres to the basic non-aggression principle, to the idea of uniformity in law (no respect of persons), and so on. This is sufficient to uphold the above legitimate methods of property transfer, and oppose all others; and things like rules of evidence, penalties, and such will evolve, most likely borrowing from the most just courts of the present day. In particular, the non-aggression principle prevents a court from ruling that someone cannot own something and giving it away because the first person has "too much" property; the owner's own arbitrator will never rule that way, and one hopes that other parties will realize that a corrupt court such as that is in no-one's interests. Of course, worst case a majority of courts will be corrupted, but then we are no worse than under a state: keeping courts from such requires vigilance, and fortunately customers can respond quickly by taking their business away from unjust judges.

Returning to the contested "homestead" land that two people claimed at the same time, price must be a mechanism to determine ownership; so long as each is able to use the land they desire (has the means to build a house, farm it, and so on), one can pay the other for the claim, which only makes sense to do if the is that much more profitable to the person offering more.

Although it may seem unfair that going concerns can claim more land, it seems reasonable on "claim day" to allow for larger claims by those more able, so long as they can use all of the land they currently own plus the new land, at the same time (allowing for letting fields rest, and so on). Leasing land out, for purposes of homestead claims, cannot be allowed to count. This will ensure that the initial distribution of former "public" land goes to where it is most valued, but not punish efficient producers for being efficient.

But won't people claim land just to get paid off to no longer make the claim? Perhaps, but they get the payment in place of claiming other available land, so it makes more sense for individuals to make another arrangement with fellow claimants (if people are claiming a road intending to put in tolls, for example, to divide it up among those interested).

Once all land of interest is claimed as equitably as possible, then homesteading ceases to occur, except when land is abandoned. The definition of "abandoned" will surely be community-defined; but if no owner can be found for a given time, or a court is shown that legitimate attempts to find a known owner or representative have failed, then the land returns to nature and the first claimant that can use it takes ownership. In the main, though, at this point land changes hands by voluntary trade.

Anti-property anarchists may note that this still allows for rental of property; although in the homesteading stage property should be used by the owner, one can trade other goods for land and then rent it out. This is reasonable; to take away such land from the owner is to rob them of whatever goods they gave for it. So might not a concern obtain large amounts of land, and eventually form a state, and rule as such within their legitimately-owned domain? Perhaps. It is hoped that several things—distribution of homesteaded land among many people, for example—will reduce the likelihood of this problem, but it's possible that rent-seeking corporations, small and large, will arise. If they're just acting as landlords, nothing is wrong; if they contract with renters to allow them most of the freedoms of ownership (excepting, for example, sale or major improvements); but when they start demanding, say, a cut of voluntary transactions on their land (sales tax), then what? People will flee, certainly, to better landlords.

I suppose if these things happen to such an extent that no land is free from such restriction, then the great experiment will have failed; but I am not terribly worried about it, due to variety and competition and the difficulty of obtaining control over enough land to be a state. Even if a company creates a "company town" they will be deserted for better employers, or competition will arise at the fringes. Courts may refuse to allow for such "taxation"—can they do so without infringing on liberty themselves? My principle of contracts, which in a rough sketch requires they be specific (contract for a particular purpose, and anything outside that is a new contract) and severable may work; for example, a contract to pay a fixed amount for rent would be fine, but one that set rent to depend on sales made would not since it depends on an unrelated and generally unobservable event that doesn't harm (hence require compensation from) the landlord. However, a landlord could separately charge a fee by number of driving customers, say, if they affected shared parking offered. There are probably ways around this idea of contracts; I'm still developing it. And I certainly understand an objection to limiting contracts, although it would be private arbitration doing the limiting, not a central body—not an excuse, an explanation.

This is intended only to start a discussion. Any further ideas would be greatly appreciated, and books on the topic of property, homesteading, and such.

Books finished: The Law.

Utopianism, and why voluntaryism isn't utopian

Political ·Sunday May 22, 2011 @ 12:11 EDT (link)

Frequently voluntaryists are attacked with the baseless assertion that voluntaryism (anarcho-capitalism) is a "utopian" philosophy. By that what is generally meant is that it assumes and relies on all men being good, or at least (in context) respecting the non-aggression principle. Despite the reams of literature about crime and punishment in a free society, this fallacy is perpetuated. Even at the recent Block-Grubel debate, Dr. Grubel, a man one would expect to know better after 40 years of studying and teaching in the area, based almost his entire counter-argument on this misconception; he had clearly not read Rothbard; from For A New Liberty:
While it is vital for the libertarian to hold his ultimate and “extreme” ideal aloft, this does not, contrary to Hayek, make him a “utopian.” The true utopian is one who advocates a system that is contrary to the natural law of human beings and of the real world. A utopian system is one that could not work even if everyone were persuaded to try to put it into practice. The utopian system could not work, i.e., could not sustain itself in operation. The utopian goal of the left: communism—the abolition of specialization and the adoption of uniformity—could not work even if everyone were willing to adopt it immediately. It could not work because it violates the very nature of man and the world, especially the uniqueness and individuality of every person, of his abilities and interests, and because it would mean a drastic decline in the production of wealth, so much so as to doom the great bulk of the human race to rapid starvation and extinction.

In short, the term “utopian” in popular parlance confuses two kinds of obstacles in the path of a program radically different from the status quo. One is that it violates the nature of man and of the world and therefore could not work once it was put into effect. This is the utopianism of communism. The second is the difficulty in convincing enough people that the program should be adopted. The former is a bad theory because it violates the nature of man; the latter is simply a problem of human will, of convincing enough people of the rightness of the doctrine. “Utopian” in its common pejorative sense applies only to the former. In the deepest sense, then, the libertarian doctrine is not utopian but eminently realistic, because it is the only theory that is really consistent with the nature of man and the world. The libertarian does not deny the variety and diversity of man, he glories in it and seeks to give that diversity full expression in a world of complete freedom. And in doing so, he also brings about an enormous increase in productivity and in the living standards of everyone, an eminently “practical” result generally scorned by true utopians as evil “materialism.”

The libertarian is also eminently realistic because he alone understands fully the nature of the State and its thrust for power. In contrast, it is the seemingly far more realistic conservative believer in “limited government” who is the truly impractical utopian. This conservative keeps repeating the litany that the central government should be severely limited by a constitution. Yet, at the same time that he rails against the corruption of the original Constitution and the widening of federal power since 1789, the conservative fails to draw the proper lesson from that degeneration. The idea of a strictly limited constitutional State was a noble experiment that failed, even under the most favorable and propitious circumstances. If it failed then, why should a similar experiment fare any better now? No, it is the conservative laissez-fairist, the man who puts all the guns and all the decision-making power into the hands of the central government and then says, “Limit yourself”; it is he who is truly the impractical utopian.
On the contrary, it is those that think, despite history, the nature of man, and all logic, that a government will remain limited, that are utopians:
Thus, even in the United States, unique among governments in having a constitution, parts of which at least were meant to impose strict and solemn limits upon its actions, even here the Constitution has proved to be an instrument for ratifying the expansion of State power rather than the opposite. As Calhoun saw, any written limits that leave it to government to interpret its own powers are bound to be interpreted as sanctions for expanding and not binding those powers. In a profound sense, the idea of binding down power with the chains of a written constitution has proved to be a noble experiment that failed. The idea of a strictly limited government has proved to be utopian; some other, more radical means must be found to prevent the growth of the aggressive State. The libertarian system would meet this problem by scrapping the entire notion of creating a government—an institution with a coercive monopoly of force over a given territory—and then hoping to find ways to keep that government from expanding. The libertarian alternative is to abstain from such a monopoly government to begin with.

If we look at the socialist program advanced sixty, or even thirty years ago, it will be evident that measures considered dangerously socialistic a generation or two ago are now considered an indispensable part of the “mainstream” of the American heritage. … In fact, one of the reasons that the conservative opposition to collectivism has been so weak is that conservatism, by its very nature, offers not a consistent political philosophy but only a “practical” defense of the existing status quo, enshrined as embodiments of the American “tradition.” Yet, as statism grows and accretes, it becomes, by definition, increasingly entrenched and therefore “traditional”; conservatism can then find no intellectual weapons to accomplish its overthrow (Ibid.)

Slavery, protection, and monopoly find defenders, not only in those who profit by them, but in those who suffer by them. If you suggest a doubt as to the morality of these institutions, it is said directly—“You are a dangerous experimenter, a utopian, a theorist, a despiser of the laws; you would shake the basis upon which society rests.” (Bastiat, The Law)
So let us hear no more of this folderol of a voluntaryist belief in “perfect people” or utopianism, which we see is rather a bit of the pot calling the kettle black coming from any statist.

Interestingly, the original, i.e. Thomas More's Utopia was much more like socialism or communism and was almost entirely unfree. Of course, that does not mean the term could not be more widely applied if it fit; the problem is that it clearly does not.

Stefan Molyneux writes in Practical Anarchy:
First and foremost, although I am an anarchist, I am not a utopian. There is no social system which will utterly eliminate evil. In a stateless society, there will still be rape, theft, murder and abuse. To be fair, just and reasonable, we must compare a stateless society not to some standard of otherworldly perfection, but rather to the world as it already is. The moral argument for a stateless society includes the reality that it will eliminate a large amount of institutionalized violence and abuse, not that it will result in a perfectly peaceful world, which of course is impossible. Anarchy can be viewed as a cure for cancer and heart disease, not a prescription for endlessly perfect health. It would be unreasonable to oppose a cure for cancer because such a cure did not eliminate all other possible diseases—in the same way, we cannot reasonably oppose a stateless society because some people are bad, and a free society will not make them good.
He continues discussing societal makeup and the implications of various combinations of good and evil and how none of them justifies a state:
Two objections constantly tend to recur whenever the subject of dissolving the State arises. The first is that a free society is only possible if people are perfectly good or rational. In other words, citizens need a centralized State because there are evil people in the world.

The first and most obvious problem with this position is that if evil people exist in society, they will also exist within the State—and be far more dangerous thereby. Citizens are able to protect themselves against evil individuals, but stand no chance against an aggressive State armed to the teeth with police and military might. Thus, the argument that we need the State because evil people exist is false. If evil people exist, the State must be dismantled, since evil people will be drawn to use its power for their own ends—and, unlike private thugs, evil people in government have the police and military to inflict their whims on a helpless and largely disarmed population.

Logically, there are four possibilities as to the mixture of good and evil people in the world:
  1. That all men are moral;
  2. That all men are immoral;
  3. That the majority of men are moral, and a minority immoral;
  4. That the majority of men are immoral, and a minority moral.
(A perfect balance of good and evil is statistically impossible.)

In the first case, (all men are moral), the State is obviously unnecessary, since evil does not exist.

In the second case, (all men are immoral), the State cannot be permitted to exist for one simple reason. The State, it is generally argued, must exist because there are evil people in the world who desire to inflict harm, and who can only be restrained through fear of State retribution (police, prisons etc). A corollary of this argument is that the less retribution these people fear, the more evil they will do. However, the State itself is not subject to any force, but is a law unto itself. Even in Western democracies, how many policemen and politicians go to jail? Thus if evil people wish to do harm but are only restrained by force, then society can never permit a State to exist, because evil people will immediately take control of that State, in order to do evil and avoid retribution. In a society of pure evil, then, the only hope for stability would be a state of nature, where a general arming and fear of retribution would blunt the evil intents of disparate groups.

The third possibility is that most people are evil, and only a few are good. If this is the case, then the State also cannot be permitted to exist, since the majority of those in control of the State will be evil, and will rule over the good minority. Democracy in particular cannot be permitted to exist, since the minority of good people would be subjugated to the democratic will of the evil majority. Evil people, who wish to do harm without fear of retribution, would inevitably take control of the State, and use its power to do their evil free of that fear. Good people act morally because they love virtue and peace of mind, not because they fear retribution—and thus, unlike evil people, they have little to gain by controlling the State. And so it is certain that the State will be controlled by a majority of evil people who will rule over all, to the detriment of all moral people.

The fourth option is that most people are good, and only a few are evil. This possibility is subject to the same problems outlined above, notably that evil people will always want to gain control over the State, in order to shield themselves from retaliation. This option changes the appearance of democracy, of course: because the majority of people are good, evil power-seekers must lie to them in order to gain power, and then, after achieving public office, will immediately break faith and pursue their own corrupt agendas, enforcing their wills with the police and military. (This is the current situation in democracies, of course.) Thus the State remains the greatest prize to the most evil men, who will quickly gain control over its awesome power—to the detriment of all good souls—and so the State cannot be permitted to exist in this scenario either.

It is clear, then, that there is no situation under which a State can logically or morally be allowed to exist. The only possible justification for the existence of a State would be if the majority of men are evil, but all the power of the State is always controlled by a minority of good men. This situation, while interesting theoretically, breaks down logically because:
  1. The evil majority would quickly outvote the minority or overpower them through a coup;
  2. Because there is no way to ensure that only good people would always run the State; and,
  3. There is absolutely no example of this having ever occurred in any of the dark annals of the brutal history of the State.
The logical error always made in the defense of the State is to imagine that any collective moral judgments being applied to any group of people is not also being applied to the group which rules over them. If 50% of citizens are evil, then at least 50% of the people ruling over them are also evil (and probably more, since evil people are always drawn to power). Thus the existence of evil can never justify the existence of the State. If there is no evil, the State is unnecessary. If evil exists, the State is far too dangerous to be allowed existence.

Why is this error always made? There are a number of reasons, which can only be touched on here. The first is that the State introduces itself to children in the form of public school teachers who are considered moral authorities. Thus is the association of morality and authority with the State first made, and is reinforced through years of repetition. The second is that the State never teaches children about the root of its power—force—but instead pretends that it is just another social institution, like a business or a church or a charity. The third is that the prevalence of religion has always blinded men to the evils of the State—which is why the State has always been so interested in furthering the interests of churches. In the religious world-view, absolute power is synonymous with perfect goodness, in the form of a deity. In the real political world of men, however, increasing power always means increasing evil. With religion, also, all that happens must be for the good—thus, fighting encroaching political power is fighting the will of the deity. There are many more reasons, of course, but these are among the deepest.

I mentioned at the beginning of this section that people generally make two errors when confronted with the idea of dissolving the State. The first is believing that the State is necessary because evil people exist. The second is the belief that, in the absence of a State, any social institutions which arise will inevitably take the place of the State. Thus, Dispute Resolution Organizations (DROs), insurance companies and private security forces are all considered potential cancers which will swell and overwhelm the body politic.

This view arises from the same error outlined above. If all social institutions are constantly trying to grow in power and enforce their wills on others, then by that very argument a centralized State cannot be allowed to exist. If it is an iron law that groups always try to gain power over other groups and individuals, then that power-lust will not end if one of them wins, but will spread across society until slavery is the norm.

It is also very hard to understand the logic and intelligence of the argument that, in order to protect us from a group that might overpower us, we should support a group that has already overpowered us. It is similar to the statist argument about private monopolies—that citizens should create a State monopoly because they are afraid of a private monopoly.
I put this note together because the fallacy comes up with shocking frequency by the naïve or ignorant, so wanted a location to send them with a comprehensive destruction of such fallacious attacks. Feel free to use it in your own discussions too, as needed.

Block-Grubel size of government debate

News, Political ·Saturday May 21, 2011 @ 21:38 EDT (link)

We went up to BC to visit relatives in Abbotsford, and to attend a size of government debate between Dr. Walter Block (anarcho-capitalist) and Dr. Herbert Grubel (neoconservative? minarchist?) I was having some trouble confirming details about the debate, such as whether we could get in without an RSVP to an email address we didn't know about (we and another couple, at least, had seen the earlier note about the debate, possibly linked from Dr. Block's Facebook page), but the more recent post was more welcoming ("So, if you're in the neighborhood, c'mon down.") That's part of the reason we waited until the last minute to call Uncle John and Aunt Sharon about stopping in; and it was surprising that they weren't busy given how involved with church, local government, and associations they are. They kindly invited us up for dinner before the debate (others were eating at the restaurant, Cheers, starting at 1800, debate at 1900, but I had no idea what the restaurant was like, or if it was restaurant at all, and not a hall with the Cheers "catering service" providing limited refreshment). We had a nice visit with them and Grandma, arriving at 1430 and leaving to head over to North Vancouver at about 1730.

We made good time despite construction on the Trans-Canada, and got to the location (parking in the garage underneath/out back) at about 1830. It was indeed a fairly typical restaurant; it's in a busy downtown area, so space is at a premium and they try to make the most of it; it appeared above "greasy spoon" and below "fine dining"; since we'd eaten we only ordered a Coke. It was $2 apiece for the debate (possibly for the cost of the room; much more reasonable than the $60 the Libertarian Party of Canada wanted for entry into their convention): the group had a medium-sized room with tables arranged in a horseshoe with the debaters and moderator Paul at the center. Dr. Block brought his son Matthew and Dr. Grubel brought his wife Helen.

Dr. Block talked about principles, focusing on the non-aggression principle and the immorality of harming innocent people.

Dr. Grubel came to a different debate entirely, and talked about his work in government and a graph not in evidence that showed somehow that economic freedom was maximized when government took 22% of all income (and baked it into pies, for all we know). He never answered Dr. Block on the principles of even the existence of government. There was a complete disconnect; some of the fallacies he committed included: ad hominem (calling Dr. Block "utopian", "idealistic", and so forth), appeal to tradition, appeal to ridicule, begging the question (assuming the ends, i.e., government, without defending them, and then claiming "we know" for facts not in evidence), post hoc (his alleged chart did not isolate for causes). Some other errors were failing to read Rothbard (and thus learning that libertarians are not utopian), and assertion that anarchists is against organization and would have to do everything for themselves from scratch (anarchist only oppose coercion, not voluntary organization: associations, businesses, etc.).

I asked Dr. Grubel if he was aware of Hume's guillotine, and if he was a utilitarian; he said he was. I asked if he would support the killing all black males of a certain age (in retrospect I felt bad about any racist implications in the question, and in future will borrow Rothbard's example of redheads when he destroyed utilitarianism) if it was shown that doing so maximized utility; he said that he would not, because it would be immoral—i.e., other principles must come into play. Not a pure utilitarian (maybe nobody is?); what are his fundamental political philosophical principles, i.e., where would he advocate the use of force? The libertarian answer is clear.

I would liked to have seen the debate as a whole be about fundamental principles, although it was good that Dr. Block could discuss libertarian organization of private police, courts, and defense, homesteading, and the like.

I got to talk to Dr. Block briefly at the end, and his son Matthew, and he sent an email out to those of us in Seattle to let us know about each other.

We left the place at around 2115, and got home just after midnight.

Books finished: Faith of the Fallen.

An eye, quite literally, for an eye

News, Law ·Saturday May 14, 2011 @ 21:09 EDT (link)

Recently the National Review article "Sulphuric Injustice" was brought to my attention. It involves an Iranian man and woman; the man pursued the woman romantically:
She rejected his advances, whereupon he threw a bucket of sulphuric acid over her. In spite of seventeen operations her face is still appallingly disfigured, unrecognizable, and she remains blinded. Under the operative [Islamic] law of retribution, known as qisas, she has the right to blind him, literally to take “an eye for an eye.” The man’s father, and bodies like Amnesty, have tried to pressure her into showing mercy. She would relent, she says, if she received two million euros to take care of her future needs. In the absence of money, she will have retribution. A doctor is due today to pour sulphuric acid into the man’s eyes.
The punishment is just. It is generous of the victim to offer an alternate acceptable compensation, even though it would seem difficult for the man to reach on his own. But let us see how much he manages to raise after all those that think the punishment is wrong donate money to his cause. Perhaps the (neo)conservatives expressing horror at this most direct and equitable form of justice will tell us how much they donated toward his cause?

Some call the punishment torture. That is false. It is not torture. It is equal retribution in return for what was done to her—not the causing of pain for its own sake, or to extract information. Not everything that causes pain is torture (nor is everything that doesn't cause pain excluded, i.e., waterboarding; there are many psychological forms of torture).

Others have called for execution of the man because he "destroyed her life". But that would not fit the crime committed (even the Godfather understood this much, as Dr. Block pointed out at a recent convention), because the man did not kill anyone. When you use figures of speech ("destroying her life") as justification for punishment (execution), you leave the realm of moral retribution and enter into the arbitrary (read: random, political) penalties of the present system (e.g., Oklahoma's recent 10-year prison sentence against a woman for selling $31 of marijuana, a victimless non-crime act that morally allows for no harm in response). The commission of a crime does not imply the giving up of all rights: and only killing allows the infringement of the right to life. A thief, for example, may be restrained with necessary force to ensure the return of what was taken, but not beaten for the sick pleasure of the police. That would not be justice, but assault and battery, and itself requires retribution and reparations.

Where would the justice be in the Western-style idea of locking the man up with three squares a day at taxpayer expense for a number of years? The taxpayers have not wronged the man; why should they suffer? The man has not wronged "society"—that fetid myth used to justify imprisonment—but a specific woman who is owed reparations and retribution. She has seen fit to forgo just retribution in return for a sum of money, as is her right, but not her obligation.

Forcing a doctor to participate, if that is indeed occurring (quite possibly he sees it as a religious duty), is also wrong; let the woman do it herself if she has the stomach for it. The man receives better than he deserves having his wickedness returned to him under the precise care of a doctor, who will also be there to care for him throughout.

Perhaps if we looked at the principles involved rather than leaping to conclusions and answers based on emotional reaction or our own cultural traditions, we would make progress. Note: I do not say not to judge other cultures, because they may frequently be wrong too; but here, they have provided for justice.

But did not the Lord himself tell us to reject the Old Testament's "eye for an eye" and instead "turn the other cheek" (Matthew 5:38-9)? Indeed; unfortunately for this man, the lady is not a Christian, and seems disinclined to show mercy. The principle of justice remains; the New Testament adds mercy, but does not replace the justice of the Old. Does the lex talionis make the world blind, like the adage? Clearly not: the buck stops here; plenty of sighted people will remain afterward; so much for that banal balderdash.

Even if this were not an Islamic country, and others were inclined to get involved, they have no right: just like Adam can't give Bob permission to hit Craig, Daniel can't forgive Ethan for hitting Fred, nor compel Fred to forsake the justice (reparations and retribution) due him. Nor may an agency, such as the state in modern society, morally do this: the thing is between victim and criminal, although agencies working for each may aid and facilitate, or may attempt to persuade and negotiate (as Amnesty is doing here), or third parties may offer money or other considerations to the victim in place of retribution. But the enforcement of arbitrary penalties (most heinously against non-crimes), and the compulsion to forgo justice owed, are utterly immoral and barbaric acts of the state.

Books finished: Asking the Right Questions, Soul of the Fire, The Ethics of Liberty.

Interventionism, isolationism, and protectionism

Political, Economics ·Tuesday May 10, 2011 @ 00:01 EDT (link)

Interventionism is seeing that the guy next door (with the scary Arab name) bought a gun for protection, and killing him and his entire family and burning down his house before he starts something. The important thing to note here is that US interventionism (1) doesn't target only the guilty (i.e., people that have harmed those that want US protection; set aside for a moment that funding for such protection is coerced from US taxpayers), but is very indiscreet about who is killed, and (2) attacks people for opinions, not actions. That is a problem, and naturally provokes hostile responses.

Isolationism brings to mind the guys living self-sufficiently on a compound, wanting nothing to do with the outside world. They don't want to see visitors; they don't want to trade with them; they may be hostile when they show up at the door; they may defend themselves if the visitors try to force their way in. And that is their choice (unless a state is forcing it on them). Very much Japan or China before Western contact was forced on them. In modern politics, it's mostly used as a straw man argument, since nobody wants it. Trade is beneficial to both parties.

Protectionism is indeed an economic measure, as said above, although it can also involve initiation of force to stop trade entirely, rather than initiation of force to extort tariffs from voluntary traders. It tends to harm the vast mass of consumers in that they get an inferior product at a higher price, but it's very good for some local producers (until they go out of business entirely due to overseas businesses eating their lunch; see also "rust belt") and unions, and they tend to lobby for such violence to protect their overpaid and inefficient jobs at the expense of everyone else in the nation.

Now we can get to non-interventionism: it is the idea that people should only fight in self-defense (imminent threat or actual harm, not mere potential): if the neighbor buys a gun, keep an eye on him all you like, but don't shoot first unless he points it at you. It is the idea that trade (including tourism and immigration) is beneficial (due to the economic concept of comparative advantage) and should not be interfered with (oppose: isolationism, which would oppose trade). Since protectionism is intervention, in general non-interventionists would oppose it, too.

Sunshine makes the state grow

Political, Economics ·Saturday May 7, 2011 @ 17:51 EDT (link)

There is I find a correlation to having great natural resources and high taxation and welfare statism. Areas with such resources - international ports like NYC, or sunny California - can attract more people, ceteris paribus, than other areas. They are in effect high-demand. So they can raise taxes without significantly affecting their population (to a point) whereas some town in Alabama could not because people would just move (not to pick on Alabama, just as an example). Heck, economically it's sound (if we disregard that taxation is coercion rather than a market price) to charge whatever the market will bear until equilibrium price (and population) is reached; look instead at property prices if you will (location, location, location!)

But then the governments of these high tax places have all this money coming in: they're not going to give it back, in fact, they're going to use it to entrench themselves in power forever by buying votes with any and all welfare programs under the sun. And so, almost literally sunshine makes government grow. And the system feeds on itself: people now want to go to these places because of the freebies, so they can keep taxing and buying votes. Except eventually you get somewhat of an Atlas Shrugged strike - except instead of moving to a gulch people move to other states or even countries. And the paying base dries up but the demand for goodies remains, explaining California's inability to pay its bills. Part of that is the stupidity of allowing governments to make promises beyond the ends of their terms, of course - they don't care, they'll be retired by then.

What the nanny-staters like to do then is federalize the problem. Much like it might not have been profitable for individual business owners to be racist and not do business with blacks back in the day - they would have lost a large amount of custom (although blacks may have generally been poor, stack enough of them together and you're talking a lot of money) - they would have lost to those without such policies - but if the town, county, or state forces everyone to segregate, or to not serve blacks, then the cost is socialized and racism becomes reasonably profitable. Similarly, if nanny states can push programs to the federal level, they force everyone to take the penalty of the tax (but also let state legislators and others have the vote-buying power of the welfare, which they like), so that moving to another state is no longer an option to avoid particular taxes and welfare. They are surely working to internationalize these programs so that one can't even escape with overseas operations.

Coffee with Kirby

News, Political, Guns ·Saturday May 7, 2011 @ 16:20 EDT (link)

I attended "Coffee with Kirby" (meetup), a PSCU event with Kirby Wilbur, the new chair of the Washington state Republican party, held at the Bothell library (1400-1530). It was quite well attended—the large ring of chairs had to be expanded several times to fit more people in—although there weren't many younger people present, unfortunately, although Kirby claimed that many of the staff at the state GOP HQ are young people which is positive.

Kirby had some good ideas to help turn former close races into Republican wins, and talked about a few candidates that last time around received little or no help from the party but still did very well; he reckoned with perhaps $5 or $10,000 from the state party those close races could have become victories. There was a bit of a discussion about the state and marriage and he seemed open to the idea that it's not the state's business. He wants to ensure that each county has a website and is involved with negotiations to set that up at a reasonable price through the national organization. He seems focused and to have some good ideas so we'll see where that goes in upcoming elections and events.

I didn't like his ranking of Reagan and Lincoln as the top two American presidents, but I accept that the brainwashing is deep and wide and won't hold it against him. I prefer this C4L list (which provides sound justification for their rankings), which has Lincoln as the worst (primarily because of the number of people killed in the war he started, the draft, destruction of the South, the income tax, …) and Reagan as 13th worst (due to Iran Contra, armed intervention everywhere, escalation of the Drug War, but points out that he did cut some taxes and regulation). Truly the president that governed best, interfered least, to borrow from Jefferson.

A woman there (I didn't get her name—Ann?) presented her idea of a Conservatives Serving America union as an idea to generate awareness by charitable giving with a conservative label on it. It was pointed out that the acronym was a bit unfortunate (CSA—Confederate States of America).

I saw Lori (from CLAMS) there but didn't get a chance to meet Ellin (if she was there). I brought my laptop; Bothell library has a decent wireless connection which was convenient.

I was approached by a nice couple afterward who thanked me for open carrying; I expect they too will be carrying at the next event, so I was happy to have been able to spread awareness of and encourage exercise of these rights. I told them about some good local ranges (WCA and SVRC) and such (and reassured them that neither was the one around here that is anti-camo and requires loading only one round at a time). We talked a little about Rothbard, since I mentioned I was finishing one of his books—turns out the guy had met him at a Mises course a while back—and about The Patriot's Guide to American History which I'm making my way through now and Zinn's The People's Guide to American History which we had both read and thought it well done.

I went over to WCA afterward to shoot my Springfield Armory XDM-9 and 1911 EMP… it was a good day.

Second amendment rally in Olympia

News, Political, Guns ·Saturday April 30, 2011 @ 17:03 EDT (link)

Previous imageEnlargeCloseNext image
Image of
We drove down to the Second Amendment Rally in Olympia (the state capital) today; the crowd wasn't that big but we did see some friends and there were a couple good speakers. I didn't bring out the flag—not enough wind, not enough of a crowd; too distracting with so few people.

I'm not sure what effect the rally had, to be honest; the legislators (except for the state senator that spoke) were surely all taking an (undeserved) weekend break. But it was good to be together with like-minded people; perhaps a venue with more passing traffic would have been better for awareness, however.

(Went to West Coast Armory range to shoot Friday evening—just pistols, all of them but the Buck Mark and Honey's XDM 3.8. We also stopped at McDonald's on the way home—open carrying, with no comments.)

Agorism in today's TV dramas

News, Political, Media ·Friday April 29, 2011 @ 00:11 EDT (link)

This seems new. It may just be that I've become more sensitive to it. But so many drama shows today seem to involve elements of agorism—society without the state, either circumventing, ignoring, evading, or providing superior alternatives to it, and not only doing so—after all, the plethora of pro-thuggery cop shows present that angle occasionally—but promoting such acts as right, superior to the state, and defending harmless acts of capitalism between consenting adults.

People are reacting negatively to excesses of law and order (and to the show franchises of the same name… and the attitudes demonstrated on them that the state can do no wrong, although some of that is gradually improving): bad laws and their enforcement, or bad cops, are news at Internet speed.

Here are a few of the shows and the voluntaryist or agorist practices they demonstrate: Are there any I missed? Am I stretching things, or seeing a trend that isn't there?

Where stops the buck?

Political ·Wednesday April 27, 2011 @ 21:46 EDT (link)

Is it the air force pilot that presses the switch to drop the bomb that is guilty of the "collateral damage" that kills innocent civilians?

Or is it the major that ordered him?

Or the colonel that made the strategic plan?

Or the general that gave him his objectives?

Or the politicians that started the war?

I think we can understand that they all bear the guilt, depending on what they know—if the airman thinks he is acting in self-defense, perhaps he is less guilty, for instance, but not if time after time he has heard of such "collateral damage" taking place (fool me once…). Similarly, when police arrest a person for a victimless "crime"—such as drug use—we can blame the policeman, his sergeant, the captain, and the chief.

We cannot, however blame the inventors or manufacturers of the tools used—the vehicles, the bombs and guns, etc.; they have no guilt in the use of said tools. They initiated no violence; and that is the key question (i.e., the non-aggression principle). It is still initiation of violence if you have someone else do it for you; if the Don orders his henchman to shoot someone, he didn't pull the trigger but he knew the result of his order and chose to take a life.

So far we have talked about the executive branch of the state. There is also culpability in the legislative branch, and to a point the judicial, for both command and give their approval to the use of violence to carry out specific objectives. If a man orders his gang to threaten, extort, or kidnap people driving a particular speed or smoking a herb or harmlessly carrying a weapon—writes it into "law"—or endorses the orders of his predecessors, he is surely as culpable for enforcement following his orders as anyone else in the chain of command. A judge that interprets or approves a law to allow harm to be done to the harmless is in a similar position. This much is obvious.

But voting muddies the waters a little. Does a legislator who votes against—or who would vote to repeal had he sufficient numbers with him—unjust legislation still bear the responsibility for its enforcement? Is he wrong as a participant in the system? Even tacit support is use of violence in favor; but I think he is exonerated if he specifically voted against a bill: we must consider actions first. But what about old laws passed by long-dead or retired legislators that are still in force and used to justify violence against peaceful people? Is it enough that a man (or woman, of course… it all applies to either sex) believably claims he would repeal any measure under concern if he could? Since we care about actions, could we not claim that the actions that made the law in question were by predecessors, and not by any present, and thus they are innocent of them? Yes: we have to blame those that actually passed the bad laws, and consider the actions of those executing them (and judges and juries). An anti-liberty attitude is not in itself an act of harm; and a pro-liberty attitude offers scant succor. There are few men in the United States (what an evil fiction that concept is) congress that have clean hands even by this generous standard; but a few might exist on particular issues (and none when they are measured against the entirety of a free society).

And how about the individual voters that voted for either a legislator that supported said assault on peaceful people, or, on the other hand, voters that voted for the "clean hands" legislator? Some would hold that even taking part in voting is violence; but there are good arguments for "defensive" voting. Are you responsible for the actions of your representative? At such arm's length, when they are acting, for all intents and purposes, independently on such a myriad of issues, usually not. But voting is action; does intent matter? Yes: the man that hits another and robs him is considered worse than the man that, while taking decent care, accidentally causes harm, and it is more likely the victim will forgo retribution (but in both cases should demand to be made whole; accident does not evade that requirement of justice). Both the retributive and restorative aspects of justice may be irrelevant by the same act of knocking someone out cold if it is in the context of an arranged match or in self-defense. Context matters.

The person that, by stealth, takes a wallet from a person is a thief; the person that takes by violence is also a thief (robber); as is the person that orders his gang to rob a specific person or generally ply their trade and profits thereby. If a man's action is to check a box so that he my profit by the extortion of his neighbor, he is no less a thief and a robber. But he might check that same box with a will to vote for the person that will do the least harm to liberty, receive no redistributed wealth, and in no wise take property from another. The circumstances of an act are thus important in whether it is good or evil.

The buck—the responsibility and someday the judgment—rests with the one who threatens or initiates violence against peaceful people; and clean hands to him who forswears it.

<Previous 10 entries>